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Abstract
Measuring the prevalence of active SARS-CoV-2 infections is difficult because tests
are conducted on a small and non-random segment of the population. But people
admitted to the hospital for non-COVID reasons are tested at very high rates, even
though they do not appear to be at elevated risk of infection. This sub-population
may provide valuable evidence on prevalence in the general population. We estimate
upper and lower bounds on the prevalence of the virus in the general population and
the population of non-COVID hospital patients under weak assumptions on who gets
tested, using Indiana data on hospital inpatient records linked to SARS-CoV-2 viro-
logical tests. The non-COVID hospital population is tested fifty times as often as the
general population. By mid-June, we estimate that prevalence was between 0.01 and
4.1 percent in the general population and between 0.6 to 2.6 percent in the non-COVID
hospital population. We provide and test conditions under which this non-COVID
hospitalization bound is valid for the general population. The combination of clinical
testing data and hospital records may contain much more information about the state
of the epidemic than has been previously appreciated. The bounds we calculate for
Indiana could be constructed at relatively low cost in many other states.
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1 Introduction
Constructing credible estimates of the current prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in the United
States is challenging. Despite growing since the start of the epidemic, testing rates remain
low in most of the country: only a small fraction of the population is tested for SARS-
CoV-2 on any given day. Moreover, tests are often allocated to people exhibiting COVID-
19 symptoms or who are thought to have come into contact with the virus (Abbott and
Lovett, 2020). For example, New York State and Texas both use a self-diagnostic tool to
screen people for testing.1 The low rate of testing in the general population means that
the number of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases almost certainly understates the true number
of infections in the population. At the same time, statistics like the fraction of tests that
are positive likely overstate population prevalence because the tested population is more
likely to be infected than the population as a whole.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to measuring the point-in-time prevalence
of active SARS-CoV-2 infections in the overall population using data on patients who are
hospitalized for non-COVID reasons. There is less uncertainty about SARS-CoV-2 preva-
lence for the non-COVID hospital patient population because people in the hospital are
tested at much higher rates than the general population, even if they are hospitalized for
reasons unrelated to COVID-19 (Sutton et al., 2020). We combine detailed testing data
and hospital data from Indiana with a family of weak monotonicity assumptions that
seem to have high credibility. The combination of these assumptions with linked testing-
hospital data leads to relatively tight upper and lower bounds on the prevalence of ac-
tive SARS-CoV-2 infections in the overall population in Indiana in each week from mid-
March to mid-June. The detailed Indiana data allows us to conduct robustness checks
that partially validate some of our assumptions. Our basic method (without the valida-
tion checks) could be implemented using data that many states are already collecting and
partially reporting. Thus, our approach could help states extract timely prevalence infor-
mation using existing surveillance data. Importantly, our paper is focused on estimates
of the fraction of the population that would test positive in each week. These estimates
are distinct from recent efforts to estimate the share of the population ever infected with
SARS-CoV-2 (Manski and Molinari, 2020). The distinction between active prevalence and
cumulative prevalence is important because the prevalence of active infections is a key
determinant of the spread of the epidemic, given that the level of immunity in the popu-
lation is thought to be quite low.
1 See https://covid19screening.health.ny.gov/covid-19-screening/ and https:
//txctt.force.com/ct/s/assessment?language=en_US.
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Estimates and forecasts of the prevalence of active SARS-CoV-2 infections are cru-
cial for public and private responses to the disease. They have shaped decisions about
disruptive non-pharmaceutical interventions such as school closures, non-essential busi-
ness closures, gathering restrictions, stay-at-home mandates, and temporary increases in
the generosity of the unemployment insurance system (Gupta et al., 2020). Reported esti-
mates of prevalence likely also motivate individual precautionary behaviors ranging from
wearing a mask to reducing demand for goods and services that require physical interac-
tion (Gupta et al., 2020; Allcott et al., 2020; Philipson, 2000, 1996; Kremer, 1996). Finally,
estimates of prevalence are a necessary input into efforts to measure other quantities of
interest, like the infection fatality rate and the infection hospitalization rate.
Given its importance, researchers have developed several approaches to measuring
SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in light of the challenge of non-representative testing. One of
the most credible is to conduct a biometric survey in which tests are offered to a repre-
sentative sample of the population (Menachemi et al., 2020; Richard M. Fairbanks School
of Public Health, 2020; Gudbjartsson et al., 2020). Other studies have tested a census of
smaller populations such as cruise ships (e.g. Russell et al. (2020)). However, it is difficult
and costly to regularly implement a survey with accurate coverage and high response
rates, especially a new survey that has not been in the field for long. A second approach
involves backcalculation methods, which use data on observed hospitalizations or deaths
to infer disease prevalence at earlier dates using assumptions about the unobserved pa-
rameters that determine the progression of the disease, hospitalization rates, and case
fatality rates (Brookmeyer and Gail, 1988; Egan and Hall, 2015; Flaxman et al., 2020; Salje
et al., 2020). Backcalculation may work well if hospitalizations or deaths are well mea-
sured, and if previous research has already reached consensus about key parameters re-
lated to the disease. However, backcalculation may be less credible for a novel virus be-
cause the scientific knowledge base is smaller. And even when backcalculation is based
on credible assumptions, it may be of limited value for public health decision making
because both hospitalizations and deaths lag current infections (Verity et al., 2020).
An alternative to biometric surveys and backcalculation is to combine non-random
clinical testing data with weak distributional assumptions to construct bounds on pop-
ulation prevalence (e.g. Manski (1999); Wing (2010)). In the COVID-19 epidemic, Stock
et al. (2020) provide bounds on population prevalence using a testing encouragement de-
sign, which is not always available. Manski and Molinari (2020) bound the share of the
population that has ever been infected under a “test monotonicity assumption” that the
infection rate is weakly higher among the tested than among the untested. This assump-
tion is appealingly credible, and the bounds can be calculated from widely available test
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data. However, even when the focus is cumulative prevalence under test monotonicity,
the prevalence bounds are often wide because testing is so rare.
We pursue a related strategy in this paper. Our analysis is based on the insight that
test rates are especially high among hospitalized patients, even patients hospitalized for
reasons that are apparently unrelated to COVID-19, such as labor and delivery or ve-
hicle accidents. The upper and lower bounds on prevalence in these populations will
tend to be much tighter than similar bounds in the general population. In addition, it is
plausible that some types of hospitalizations occur for reasons that are independent of
infection risk. For example, people who are hospitalized for injuries sustained in a traf-
fic accident might be expected to have about the same risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection as
the general population. We build on this insight to estimate more informative upper and
lower bounds on weekly SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in the population.
Our paper makes some methodological contributions that may be relevant to the de-
velopment of more informative public health surveillance systems. We describe the con-
ditions under which upper and lower bounds on active prevalence among non-COVID
hospitalizations are valid estimates of the upper and lower bounds on prevalence in the
general population. We maintain the test monotonicity assumption throughout, and we
derive upper and lower bounds on prevalence in the population under two alternative
assumptions about the representativeness of non-COVID hospitalizations for the broader
population. The first assumption is a relatively weak “hospital monotonicity” assump-
tion that prevalence is at least as high among non-COVID hospital patients as it is in the
general population. This assumption would be satisfied even if hospitalized patients are
at greater risk of COVID because, for example, people who get into car accidents have
more social interactions. The second assumption is a stronger ”hospital independence”
assumption that prevalence is the same among non-COVID hospital patients as it is in
the general population. The resulting bounds are informative for prevalence at a point in
time, not just cumulative prevalence. This is important because the information required
to estimate the bounds is closely related to the simple statistics that many states already
report. It appears possible for many states to use our method to report upper and lower
bounds on prevalence in near real time using data that they already collect and report.
In particular, states already report the COVID-hospitalization rate, as well as overall test
rates and test positivity rates. To report a version of the upper and lower bounds we
describe in this paper, states would simply have to compute testing and positivity rates
among non-COVID hospitalizations.
Our first empirical contribution uses this framework to estimate upper and lower
bounds on weekly prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in Indiana. To operationalize the basic
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idea, we work with two definitions of non-COVID hospitalizations. The first, which we
call non-Influenza- or COVID-like-illness (non-ICLI) hospitalizations, simply excludes all
hospitalizations with diagnosis for ICLI (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020;
Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, 2015). This definition would be easy to imple-
ment in many different hospital data sets and yields a large population of hospital pa-
tients. However, we also work with a definition using a narrower set of patients who are
hospitalized for six groups of clear non-COVID causes: (i) cancer; (ii) appendicitis and
vehicle accidents; (iii) labor and delivery; (iv) AMI and stroke; (v) fractures, crushes, and
open wounds; and (vi) other accidents. The clear-cause analysis is more intuitive and
transparent, but it is based on smaller samples and might be harder to implement as part
of a public health surveillance system.
We show that, in Indiana, test rates are much higher among non-COVID hospital pa-
tients than in the general population. For example, in June, about 0.4 percent of the gen-
eral population was tested in a given week, compared with 24 percent of non-COVID
hospital patients; test positivity rates are lower among non-COVID hospital patients than
in the general population. In the general population, 4.1 percent of tests were positive.
In contrast, among non-COVID hospital patients who were tested, only 2.6 percent of
tests were positive. These testing and positivity rates can be combined to estimate up-
per and lower bounds on prevalence. Under the test monotonicity assumption, between
0.01 and 4.1 percent of the general population was infected with SARS-CoV-2 on June
15. Under the same test monotonicity assumption, the bounds are half as wide for non-
COVID hospital patients: prevalence was between 0.6 and 2.6 percent. Under the hospi-
tal monotonicity assumption, the upper bound on prevalence in the non-COVID hospital
population is a valid upper bound on population prevalence. And under the stronger
hospital independence assumption, the upper and lower bounds on prevalence in the
non-COVID hospital population are valid upper and lower bounds on population preva-
lence. The bounds on prevalence based on the non-ICLI definition are typically very
similar to the bounds based on the clear-cause definition. We present bounds under al-
ternative hospital representativeness assumptions (none, monotonicity, independence) to
allow readers to make their own judgements about which assumptions are credible, and
to better understand how much information about prevalence is derived from the data
versus assumptions.
We also calculate bounds among ICLI hospitalizations. We find, of course, much
higher prevalence among this group, but our bounds still rule out very high prevalence.
Specifically, we find that SARS-CoV-2 prevalence among ICLI hospitalizations is no higher
than 50 percent at its peak, and no higher than about 30 percent by mid-June. This shows
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that there is value to testing even highly symptomatic patients, as their SARS-CoV-2 rate
is far from 100 percent, and testing outcomes would be informative for treatment and
quarantine decisions.
Our second empirical contribution is to assess the credibility of key assumptions that
would be difficult to study in other data sets. Manski and Molinari (2020) point out that
the accuracy of SARS-CoV-2 virological tests is not well understood. Incorporating infor-
mation about testing errors alters the bounds on prevalence. We use data on people who
were tested twice in a two day period to shed some light on the fraction of people who
test negative but are actually infected. We tentatively conclude that test errors are have a
negligible effect on the upper and lower bounds on prevalence reported in our paper.
We also assess the credibility of the hospital representativeness assumptions at the
core of the paper. The most restrictive hospital independence condition assumes that
SARS-CoV-2 prevalence is the same in the non-COVID and general populations, and
the weaker hospital monotonicity condition assumes that prevalence is at least as high
among the hospitalized. Although we are not able to directly validate these assumptions,
we probe their credibility in two ways. First, we compare the hospitalization bounds to
estimates of population prevalence obtained from tests of a random sample of Indiana
residents in April and June (Menachemi et al., 2020; Richard M. Fairbanks School of Pub-
lic Health, 2020). Second, we examine the pre-hospitalization test rates of non-COVID
hospitalized patients. These validity checks are roughly consistent with the the hospi-
tal independence assumption, and highly consistent with hospital monotonicity. This
suggests that these assumptions might be considered reasonable in other states where it
would be easy to estimate the upper and lower bounds but harder to perform elaborate
validation exercises.
Overall, our results indicate that combining testing data and information on non-
COVID hospitalizations may be a feasible and informative way of measuring SARS-CoV-
2 prevalence. In the most recent weeks of our data (and under test monotonicity but
without hospitalization data), we can only conclude that at most 4 percent of the over-
all Indiana population was actively infected. With hospitalization data and the hospital
monotonicity assumption, we can conclude that at most 2.6 percent of the Indiana popula-
tion was infected. Despite this substantial improvement, the bounds remain wide enough
that we cannot conclude whether prevalence has fallen since early April. Similar bounds
could be constructed in other states using aggregate data on non-COVID hospitalizations
and their testing and test positivity rates, potentially improving COVID surveillance sys-
tems across the country.
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2 Inferring COVID prevalence from incomplete testing
The empirical goal of our study is to bound the fraction of the Indiana population
that is infected with SARS-CoV-2 in each week. To fix ideas, we use i = 1...N to index
the population of Indiana. Let Cit = 1 indicate that person i is currently infected with
SARS-CoV-2 on date t. The population prevalence of active SARS-CoV-2 infections in
Indiana at date t is Pr(Cit = 1) = 1N
∑N
i=1Cit, where we leave conditioning on date t
implicit to reduce clutter. We are also interested in prevalence among hospital inpatients
with various COVID- and non-COVID-related diagnoses. This is simply the probability
that a person is infected, conditional on being hospitalized for a specified condition or set
of conditions. Let Hit be a binary indicator set to 1 if the person was hospitalized with
a non-COVID-related diagnosis. Then Pr(Cit = 1|Hit = 1) is the prevalence of active
SARS-CoV-2 infections in the sub-population of people who were admitted with a non-
COVID-related diagnosis on date t.
A key inferential challenge in estimating prevalence is that values of Cit are unknown
for most people on most days, because testing is rare. Let Dit = 1 if person i was tested
on t and Dit = 0 if the person was not tested. Let Pr(Dit = 1) represent the proportion of
the population tested on date t, where conditioning on t is implicit. Continuing with the
notation laid out above, Pr(Cit|Dit = 1) and Pr(Cit|Dit = 0) represent prevalence among
people who are tested and not tested, respectively. The value of Cit is observed for people
where Dit = 1, but unknown for people where Dit = 0, which means that Pr(Cit|Dit = 0)
is not identified by the data on testing and test outcomes.2 We define prevalence in the
tested and untested hospital populations similarly, but with conditioning on both testing
status and hospitalization status.
2.1 Worst Case Bounds
In the absence of any distributional assumptions, the observed clinical tests partially
identify prevalence overall, and in any sub-populations that can be defined by observable
covariates. Use the law of total probability to decompose population prevalence:
Pr(Cit) = Pr(Cit|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1) + Pr(Cit|Dit = 0)Pr(Dit = 0)
2 Our analysis here assumes that there is no measurement error involved in COVID-19 testing procedures.
In practice, false negatives and false positives could create additional uncertainty. We abstract from such
concerns throughout the paper.
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The only unknown quantity on the right-hand side of the expression is Pr(Cit|Dit = 0),
which is prevalence among people who were not tested. Without any additional assump-
tions or data, all that is known is that this value lies between 0 and 1. Substituting 0 and
1 for the unknown prevalence yields worst-case lower and upper bounds Lw and Uw on
population prevalence:
Lw = Pr(Cit|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1),
Uw = Pr(Cit|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1) + Pr(Dit = 0).
These bounds define the set of values for unknown population prevalence that are com-
patible with the observed data and the logical definition of prevalence. The lower bound
is the confirmed positive rate, and the upper bound is that rate plus the untested rate.
The width of the worst-case bounds on a given day is decreasing in that day’s testing
rate. Testing more people can only increase the confirmed positive rate and decrease the
untested rate. However if few people are tested, the bounds can be very wide.
2.2 Test monotonicity
To narrow the bounds, Manski and Molinari (2020) propose the “test monotonicity”
condition. This condition requires that the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 is at least as high
in the tested population as it is in the untested population. Formally, test monotonicity
implies that Pr(Cit|Dit = 1) ≥ Pr(Cit|Dit = 0). This is an appealing condition because
virological tests are typically allocated to symptomatic individuals, who have a higher
than average likelihood of infection.
Under test monotonicity, prevalence in the tested sub-population represents an upper
bound on the unknown prevalence among the untested sub-population. The lower bound
remains the worst-case lower bound. The lower and upper bounds under monotonicity,
Lm and Um, are:
Lm = Pr(Cit|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1),
Um = Pr(Cit|Dit = 1).
The new upper bound will be lower than the worst-case upper bound as long as preva-
lence in the tested sub-population is less than 1. In our data, test rates are less than 1
percent and positivity rates in the population are roughly 10 percent, so this assumption
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brings the upper bound down from 99 percent to 10 percent or less. A similar assumption
could be made for the non-COVID hospitalization population, yielding bounds LHm and
UHm on prevalence among the non-COVID hospitalized population.
2.3 Inferring population prevalence from non-COVID hospital patients
Test monotonicity can be used to narrow the the bounds on prevalence in the popula-
tion and among non-COVID hospitalized patients. Because testing rates are much higher
in hospitals than in the general population, the bounds on prevalence in hospitalized sub-
populations are much narrower. Thus, assumptions that link hospital and population
prevalence may be a powerful way to reduce uncertainty about population prevalence.
We pursue two types of assumptions that enable extrapolation from non-COVID hospi-
tal populations to the general population: (i) monotone selection into hospitalization and
(ii) risk-independent hospitalization. These are both forms of hospital instrumental variable
assumptions, and we refer to them collectively as hospital IV assumptions.
Hospital monotonicity lowers the population upper bound
The hospital monotonicity assumption requires that the prevalence of active SARS-
CoV-2 infections among non-COVID hospital patients is not lower than the prevalence of
active infections in the general (non-hospitalized) population. Formally, Pr(Cit|Hit =
1) ≥ Pr(Cit). When prevalence is bounded in the hospitalized and general popula-
tions, the hospital monotonicity assumption may further reduce the width of both sets
of bounds by ruling out values that would violate it.
In particular, under hospital monotonicity, the upper bound on population prevalence
cannot be larger than the upper bound on hospital prevalence. When both the hospital
monotonicity assumption and the test monotonicity assumption are imposed, the upper
bound on SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in the population is
Um,h = min
{
Um, U
H
m
}
= min {Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1), P r(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Hit = 1)} ,
where Um is the upper bound on prevalence in the population under hospital monotonic-
ity and UHm is the upper bound on prevalence among non-COVID hospital patients. In
our data, the hospital upper bound is typically lower than the population upper bound,
so the hospital monotonicity condition in practice implies that the positivity rate among
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non-COVID hospitalizations is an upper bound population prevalence.3
Hospital independence tightens both population bounds
A stronger assumption that also facilitates extrapolation from a hospitalized sub-population
to the general population is a “hospital independence” assumption, which means that
hospitalization for non-COVID-related health conditions is mean independent of infec-
tion with SARS-CoV-2. Independence implies that people infected with SARS-CoV-2 have
the same probability of being hospitalized for a non-COVID condition as people who are
not infected with SARS-CoV-2 so that Pr(Hit|Cit = 1) = Pr(Hit|Cit = 0). Equivalently,
the independence assumption implies that SARS-CoV-2 prevalence is the same among
people who are hospitalized for non-COVID conditions and the general population. That
is, under the hospital independence assumption: Pr(Cit|Hjit) = Pr(Cit). The indepen-
dence assumption implies that non-COVID hospitalizations are an instrumental variable
for testing. This assumption would be satisfied if non-COVID hospitalizations arose ran-
domly in the population, for example because of health conditions (such as pregnancy or
heart disease) determined prior to the epidemic. The hospital independence assumption
would fail, however, if hospitalization risk was systematically related to COVID-19 risk,
for example because essential workers have more social interactions and greater likeli-
hood of hospitalizations.
Under the hospital independence assumption, the bounds on the common prevalence
parameter are defined by the intersection of the hospital and population bounds. The
lower and upper bounds under test monotonicity and hospital independence, Lm,ind and
Um,ind, are:
Lm,ind = max
{
Um, U
H
m
}
= max {Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1), P r(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Hit = 1)} ,
Um,ind = min
{
Um, U
H
m
}
= min {Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1), P r(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Hit = 1)} .
Under hospital independence (as well as test monotonicity), the upper bound on preva-
lence is the same as under hospital monotonicity. What the hospital independence as-
sumption buys us is a tighter lower bound, which is now the greater of the lower bounds
3 In principle, the same assumption could be used to derive a potentially higher lower bound on prevalence
in the hospital population. But this lower bound condition is essentially non-binding in practice, so we
ignore it here.
9
on population and hospital prevalence under test monotonicity. In practice we find that
the lower bound is always higher in the non-COVID hospitalization sub-population than
in the general population, so in practice this assumption implies that the lower bound on
population prevalence is the confirmed positive rate among non-COVID hospitalizations.
2.4 Measurement Error in Testing
Virological tests for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 may not be perfectly accurate, and
so far there are no detailed studies of the performance of the PCR tests that Indiana is
using to test people for SARS-CoV-2. To clarify how error-ridden tests complicate our
prevalence estimates, we augment our notation to distinguish between test results and
virological status. We continue to use Cit to represent a person’s true infection status,
and we still use Dit to indicate whether a person was tested at date t or not. But now
we introduce Rit, which is a binary measure set to 1 if the person tests positive and 0
if the person tests negative. Using this notation, Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Rit = 1) is called
the Positive Predictive Value (PPV) of the test among people who are tested and who
test positive. Pr(Cit = 0|Dit = 1, Rit = 0) is called the Negative Predictive Value (NPV)
among people who are tested and who test negative. 1−NPV = Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Rit =
0) is the fraction of people who test negative who are actually infected with SARS-CoV-2.
Our initial worst case bounds assumed no test errors. Relaxing that assumption yields
a different set of upper and lower bounds on prevalence. Following Manski and Molinari
(2020), we assume that (i) PPV = 1 so that none of the positive tests are false, but (ii)
Pr(Cit = 1|Dit = 1, Rit = 0) ∈ [λl, λu]. The second condition imposes a bound on 1−NPV ,
which is the fraction of people who test negative who are actually infected. Under these
two restrictions, the new worst case bounds work out to:
Lw,λ = Lw + λlPr(Rit = 0|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1)
Uw,λ = Uw + λuPr(Rit = 0|Dit = 1)Pr(Dit = 1)
Allowing for test errors in this way increases the worst case lower bound by the best-case
fraction of missing positives, and increases the worst case upper bound by the worst-case
fraction of missing positives. Similar expressions hold for prevalence bounds under test
monotonicity and other independence assumptions.
The upshot of this analysis is that knowledge of test accuracy is important for efforts
to learn about prevalence. In their study of the cumulative prevalence of SARS-CoV-2
infections, Manski and Molinari (2020) computed upper and lower bounds on prevalence
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under the assumption that λl = .1 and λu = .4, citing Peci et al. (2014). Manski and
Molinari (2020) view this choice of .1 ≤ 1 − NPV ≤ .4] as an expression of scientific
uncertainty about test errors, and they refer to the resulting prevalence bounds as “illus-
trative”. However, the structure of the test error bounds makes it clear that assumptions
about the numerical magnitude of test errors have inferential consequences. For example,
setting λu = .4 implies that, regardless of the outcome of the test, at least 40 percent of the
people who are tested for SARS-CoV-2 are infected.
Although there is little published evidence on the properties of the SARS-CoV-2 PCR
test, previous research suggests that PCR test errors are uncommon in other settings. For
example, Peci et al. (2014) study the performance of rapid influenza tests using PCR-based
tests as a gold standard. PCR tests are used as a gold standard because they are expected
to have very high PPV and NPV.
To shed more light on test errors, we constructed a sample of people who were (i)
tested on day t, (ii) not tested on day t−1, and (iii) were tested again on day t+1. A total of
16,401 test pairs met this criteria. Using R1i and R2i to represent the results of a person’s
first and second test, we found that Pr(R1i = 1, R2i = 1) = .11 and Pr(R1i = 0, R2i =
0) = .88 among the people in the twice-tested sample. The two tests were discordant for
less than 1 percent of the twice-tested sample. In Appendix C, we estimate prevalence
and NPV in the twice-tested sample under the strong assumptions that the tests have
specificity equal to 1, sensitivity does not depend on initial test result, and retesting is
random. Using this method, we find that prevalence was 12 percent and NPV = 0.995
in the twice-tested sample. With 1 − NPV = 0.005, the estimates imply only about 0.5
percent of people who test negative are actually infected.
The twice-tested sample is likely not representative of the population, of course. Peo-
ple who are re-tested after a negative test are probably highly symptomatic.4 This sug-
gests that 1 − NPV = Pr(Cit|Dit, Rit = 0) is probably higher in the twice-tested sample
than in the population. Accordingly, we think that a plausible value for λl is nearly zero,
and a plausible value for λu is 0.005. Accounting for test errors in this range would have
almost no effect on the upper and lower bounds reported in the paper.
2.5 Summary and data requirements
Our bounds turn out to be fairly simple objects. Under test monotonicity, the lower
bound on prevalence is the confirmed positive rate, the share of the population that tests
4 Furthermore, it is possible that the first sample was drawn with less care than the second sample, suggest-
ing that specificity may have differed across the repeated tests.
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positive. The corresponding upper bound under monotonicity is the test positivity rate,
the share of tests that are positive. Under hospital monotonicity, the upper bound be-
comes the test positivity rate among non-COVID hospitalizations. And under hospital
representativeness, the lower bound becomes the confirmed positive rate among non-
COVID hospitalizations.
An appealing feature of these bounds is that they can be calculated with little addi-
tional data beyond what public health organizations already report. Every state already
reports the number of tests and the number of positive tests, and many states report
the number of COVID-related hospitalizations.5 States would only have to report test
and positivity rates for non-COVID-related hospitalizations. This appears possible be-
cause many states already report ”suspected” or ”under investigation” COVID hospital-
izations, defined as hospitalized patients exhibiting COVID-like illness. Some states actu-
ally report both the number of hospitalizations of patients with COVID- or influenza-like
illness and, separately, the number of hospitalizations of patients with a positive SARS-
CoV-2 test (e.g. Arizona and Illinois (Arizona Department of Health Services, 2020; Illi-
nois Department of Public Health, 2020a,b)).6 Thus states have the capacity to identify
ICLI-related hospitalizations and link hospitalization and testing data.
3 Indiana Hospital and Testing Data
3.1 Data sets
Our analysis is based on two main data sources managed by the Regenstrief Institute.
First we obtain data on the near universe of clinical virological tests for SARS-CoV-2 con-
ducted in Indiana between January 1, 2020 and June 18, 2020. Second we obtained data on
all inpatient hospital admissions from hospitals that belong to the Indiana Network for
Patient Care (INPC), which is a health information exchange that centralizes and stores
data from health providers across the state of Indiana, including all hospitals with emer-
gency departments.7 The hospital data are derived from the same database that the state
uses for reporting hospitalizations on its dashboard (Indiana State Department of Health,
2020). We link the testing and hospital data using an encrypted common identifier. Of
5 See, e.g., The COVID Tracking Project (2020).
6 States reporting both confirmed SARS-CoV-2 hospitalizations and hospitalizations of suspected cases
or cases under investigation include California (California Department of Health, 2020), Colorado (Col-
orado Department of Public Health and Environment, 2020), Mississippi (Mississippi State Department of
Health, 2020), Tennessee (Tennessee Department of Health, 2020), and Vermont (Vermont Department of
Health, 2020).
7 See Grannis et al. (2005) for more details.
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course, only a subset of hospital patients are tested and only a subset of tested people
appear in the inpatient hospital data. For both data sets, we are also able to link the data
with basic demographic data collected by the INPC; this information is available only for
a subset of patients.
The test data contain individual records for nearly all of the SARS-CoV-2 tests con-
ducted in Indiana during 2020. A small number of tests are excluded from our data be-
cause some institutions that conduct tests provide data to INPC but do not allow the data
to be used for research purposes. The consequence of these exclusions is that we are
missing some tests, which will result in a reduced lower bound in our framework. De-
spite these exclusions, our data set tracks the state’s official case counts fairly closely; see
Appendix Figure A.1. As an aggregate summary, our data contain 39,472 total positive
tests, and the state reports 41,541 positive tests as of June 18 (Indiana State Department of
Health, 2020).8 Each test record in our testing data includes information on the date the
test was run, the outcome of the test (positive, negative, or inconclusive), and a patient
identifier that we use to link the test data to demographic files and inpatient hospital files.
The hospital inpatient data contain separate observations for each admission. We al-
ways observe admission time and a patient identifier that we use to link to the test data
and inpatient files. We observe discharge time and diagnosis information only for a sub-
set of admissions. (Not all fields are available for all admissions because different insti-
tutions contribute different information to the INPC.) Because the INPC data come from
health care providers and payers, the same hospitalization can appear in the data set mul-
tiple times. To de-duplicate these records, we keep one observation per admission time
(defined second-by-second), keeping the observation with the most diagnosis codes.9
3.2 Key measures
In-hospital testing, positivity rate, and confirmed positives The fraction of people
who are tested in the hospital is an important quantity of interest in our analysis because
hospital patients are tested at a higher rate than the general population, and hospital test-
ing may be less correlated with COVID symptoms. Our data do not distinguish whether
a person was tested in the hospital or whether the test was initiated independently of the
8 We compare positives rather than tests because some testing institutions appear not to report negative
tests to the state. (Such institutions are not included in our data.)
9 This procedure could in principle result in us dropping relevant diagnostic information, but in practice this
would happen only very rarely. There are 311,127 admissions that are unique in terms of patient identifier
and time, and 270,576 non-unique admissions. In 579 of these non-unique cases are there multiple records
with the same number of diagnostic codes; we keep one of these multiples at random. In 30 of the 270,576
cases there are multiple records with diagnosis codes that provide conflicting first diagnoses.
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hospital visit. We say that a hospitalized patient was tested in-hospital if she had at least
one SARS-CoV-2 test dated between 2 days prior to admission to 4 days after admission.
We chose to focus on this week-long period, rather than strictly between admission and
discharge, for three reasons. First, some patients will be tested prior to admission, as part
of their preparation for admission. Thus it is valuable to look prior to admission. Second,
we observe the date the test is run, not the the date the sample is collected. Backlogs in
the testing system may mean that a patient is discharged before the test is run. Third, for
some admissions, we lack discharge dates, but we can still define in-hospital tests using
this measure.
We say that a patient tests positive in the hospital if she has at least one positive
COVID test between 2 days prior to admission and 4 days after admission. We define
the positivity rate as the fraction of tests that are positive; the confirmed positive rate is
the fraction of the population with a positive test.
Population Testing and Positivity Rates In some analyses we compare hospital test-
ing and positivity to population testing and positivity. Hospital testing and positivity are
defined over a week-long span for a given hospitalization. To make the comparison with
the general population clean, we examine test rates and positivity in a given week-long
period. We say that a person was tested if she was tested at least once in a given week,
and we say she was positive if she was positive at least once in that period.
3.3 Sample construction
Throughout, a patient is in the “test sample” if they are tested at least once. We say
a patient is in the “inpatient sample” if they are hospitalized at least once. We limit our
analysis to admissions with non-missing diagnostic information, and we say a patient
is in the “inpatient diagnoses sample” if they meet this restriction. This limitation is
important because diagnostic information is necessary for distinguishing COVID-related
admissions from non-COVID-related admissions.
ICLI and non-ICLI Hospitalizations We construct three analytic samples from the in-
patient data. We start by defining hospitalizations for influenza- and COVID-like illness
(ICLI) using ICD-10 codes. We identify admissions with any of a standard set of ICD-10
codes for ICLI following Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (2015). Then we iden-
tify admissions with any of the additional ICD-10 codes that the CDC recommends using
for coding COVID hospitalizations (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020).
Both the influenza-like and COVID-like diagnoses include general symptoms such as
cough or fever, as well as more specific diagnoses like acute pneumonia, viral influenza,
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or COVID-19. We classify hospitalizations as ICLI-related if they have any influenza-
or COVID-like illness (ICLI) diagnoses, and we classify hospitalizations as non-ICLI if
they are not ICLI-related. Appendix B lists the ICD-10 codes used to define the analytic
samples.
We view the non-ICLI sample as a useful starting point for our analysis for two rea-
sons. First, our hospital IV assumptions are most plausible for hospitalizations that are
not obviously COVID-related, and this sample meets that criteria. Second, as we have
noted, many states already classify hospitalizations as ICLI-related; thus non-ICLI hospi-
talizations are identifiable and measurable in near-real time, so this sample can be studied
more broadly.
We acknowledge, however, that the non-ICLI sample may not satisfy the hospital IV
assumptions for at least two reasons. First, it may condition on COVID itself, since a pa-
tient with a reported COVID diagnosis would be excluded from it. (In practice we observe
many patients with positive COVID tests but no COVID diagnosis.) Second, COVID is a
new disease with heterogeneous symptoms, so even if a patient is hospitalized because
of COVID, she may not have one of our flagged diagnoses, and we may incorrectly call
her hospitalization non-ICLI (Yang et al., 2020).
Clear-cause sample To avoid these problems, we study a third sample, which we call
the “clear cause” sample. These are hospitalizations with a clear cause that is not obvi-
ously COVID-related. We define clear-cause hospitalizations as hospitalizations with a
diagnosis code for labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fractures, crushes, open wounds, ap-
pendicitis, vehicle accidents, other accidents, or cancer. For all of these conditions except
cancer, we flag hospitalizations with a diagnosis at any priority. For cancer, we flag hos-
pitalizations with a cancer diagnosis code as the admitting diagnosis, the primary final
diagnosis, or any chemotherapy diagnosis. Appendix B lists the ICD-10 codes used for
these classifications.
We view the clear-cause sample as important for two reasons. First, we believe the
hospital IV assumptions are most plausible for this sample, so we believe the bounds on
prevalence are most likely to be valid. Second, we view the clear-cause sample as offering
a test of the validity of the non-ICLI sample. To the extent that the two samples gener-
ate similar bounds, we can be more confident that the non-ICLI sample is informative of
broader population COVID prevalence, despite the problems with the non-ICLI classifi-
cation. This would be valuable because classifying hospitalizations as ICLI-related or not
requires less information than ascertaining a clear cause of the hospitalization.
Summary statistics We show summary statistics for all of our samples in Table 1, as
well as for the state as a whole (from Census Fact Finder and United States Census Bu-
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reau (2019)). The average tested and hospitalized patient is substantially older than the
population as a whole, and also more likely to be female. Because the tested and hos-
pitalized samples are not age representative of the general population, we reweight all
samples to match the population age distribution. The tested and hospitalized samples
are fairly similar to the general population in terms of racial composition. Limiting the
inpatient sample to admissions with diagnoses reduces our sample size substantially, but
it does not appear to change its demographic profile. Although our main analysis looks
at test rates at the admission level (rather than the person level), the summary statis-
tics show that hospitalized patients are vastly more likely to have ever been tested than
the population as a whole – about 21 percent of ever-hospitalized patients, compared to
about 280,000 out of 6.64 million (4.2 percent) for the general population. ICLI-related
hospitalizations are especially likely to have ever been tested.
4 Bounds on COVID-19 prevalence
4.1 Bounds by broad sample
Figure 1 shows the SARS-CoV-2 testing rate for each of the sub-populations in our
analysis. We report the exact values of each of the test rates and the weekly number
of admissions in Appendix Table A.1. Because the tested and hospitalized populations
have very different age distributions compared to the rest of the population, we reweight
the hospital sub-populations to match the coarsened age distribution in the population.
Specifically, we calculate test rates in week-by-age-group cells, for age groups 0-17, 18-
30, 30-50, 50-64, 65-74, and 75 and older. Then we average these age-specific testing
rates across the age groups, weighting each group by its population share. We report
unweighted test rates in Appendix Table A.2.
Figure 1 shows vastly higher test rates in the hospitalized samples than in the general
population. The testing rate in the general population grew from 0.2 percent in April to
between 0.4 and 0.6 percent in May and June. So despite tripling, the weekly test in the
Indiana population rate remained below 1 percent. In contrast, people hospitalized for
ICLI were tested at a very high rate, between 65 and 75 percent in most weeks. Testing
rates among non-ICLI hospital patients and among the clear-cause non-COVID hospital
patients were lower than the ICLI sample but much higher than the population overall,
about 20 percent in April and 25-30 percent in May and June. In other words, testing rates
among non-COVID hospital inpatients are about 50 times higher than testing rates in the
general population, but they are typically less than half as high as testing rates in the ICLI
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population.
These high test rates imply tighter bounds on population prevalence under test mono-
tonicity, as we show in Figure 2 and report in Appendix Table A.3. We age-weight the
bounds, analogously to our weighting of test rates, and we report unweighted bounds in
Appendix Table A.4. Several patterns are clear in the figure. First, the ICLI hospitalized
population has higher upper and lower bounds on prevalence than the other groups. For
the ICLI patients, the prevalence bounds are 5-22 percent in the first week of our sample,
then increase to 30-40 percent in the last week of March, before declining steadily to 11-18
percent in the final week of the sample. These bounds rule out the possibility that all or
nearly all symptomatic patients are infected with SARS-CoV-2. In most weeks the ICLI
bounds lie outside the other groups’ bounds, implying (unsurprisingly) unambiguously
higher COVID prevalence. This separation shows that the data are sensible and that the
bounds are informative enough to tell apart these highly distinct populations.
The second clear pattern in the figure is that the prevalence bounds are tighter for
the non-ICLI and clear-cause hospitalization samples than for the all-test sample. In fact
the bounds for both of these hospitalizations samples are always contained within the
all-test bounds. Even at their tightest, the bounds for the all-test sample are as wide
as 0.02 to 3.6 percent in the last week of our data. In that week the bounds for non-ICLI
hospitalizations are [0.6%, 2.4%] and for clear-cause hospitalizations they are [0.5%, 1.9%].
This tight bound implies that the hospitalization data could be informative for population
prevalence (under hospital monotonicity or mean independence).
The final pattern evident in Figure 2 is that the bounds for the non-ICLI hospitalization
sample and for the clear-cause hospitalization sample are nearly indistinguishable. The
only noticeable difference is that the upper bound for non-ICLI hospitalization is perhaps
slightly higher. This fact is important because non-ICLI hospitalizations are potentially
easier to measure, but they may be negatively selected in the sense that by construction
they may exclude COVID-likely cases. The similarity of the non-ICLI bounds with the
bounds for the clear-cause sample (which is not selected based on COVID-likelihood)
provides some evidence in support of using non-ICLI hospitalizations to measure general
prevalence.
4.2 Bounds by cause of admission
Our clear-cause hospitalization sample pools many distinct causes, including among
others labor and delivery, vehicle accidents, and other accidents, including falls. In prin-
ciple these hospitalizations may differ in their COVID likelihood. One might worry, for
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example, that pregnant women are especially cautious and careful not to become infected,
whereas people getting into vehicle accidents may be less cautious (either because they
are not careful drivers, or because they are out of the house at all).
We therefore report test rates and bounds for disaggregated causes as well as the over-
all clear-cause sample. We focus on six sets of causes: cancers, appendicitis and vehicle
accidents, injuries (fractures/crush/wounds), non-vehicle accidents, and AMI/stroke.
These six groups have reasonable sample sizes throughout (they each have 1,000-1,500
admissions per month), and the demographic profiles within each group are roughly sim-
ilar; see Appendix Table A.5 for age profiles of admitted patients by cause of admission.
All ages are represented in the cancer sample: appendicitis and vehicle accidents both
afflict young people; AMI, stroke, and other accidents—primarily falls—afflict older peo-
ple; and labor and delivery is limited, of course, to women of childbearing age.10 Because
not all age groups are represented in every category, we do not age-weight these results.
We report the monthly test rates for each of these groups in Figure 3. We also report
sample sizes, exact tests rates, and bounds in Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7, by month and
cause. All causes had relatively low test rates in March before rapid increases in April and
May. By June there are some differences in the test rates, with higher rates for the injury,
accident, and AMI/stroke admissions, and less testing for cancer and labor and delivery.
We report the bounds on prevalence by cause of admission in Figure 4. In March there
is little testing; the bounds are wide and uninformative. The bounds tighten in April,
May, and especially June. Importantly, we do not see obvious, systematic differences
across the groups. Typically the bounds overlap, and there is no strong evidence that the
upper or lower bounds differ by cause of admission. It is true that in June, cancer patients
had zero positive tests, and the upper bound for appendicitis and vehicle accidents was
below the lower bounds for injuries, other accidents, and AMI/stroke. However in April
and May the cancer and appendicitis/vehicle patients had similar or even higher upper
bounds than did the injury and other accident patients. This evidence shows that patients
admitted to the hospital for different reasons and with different demographic profiles
are all nonetheless tested at a high rate and with similar bounds on prevalence. This
is perhaps reassuring for the view that pooling many distinct causes of admissions can
nonetheless generate meaningful bounds on prevalence.
10 These groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in particular there is overlap between injury
and accidents.
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5 Assessing the hospital representativeness assumptions
The results so far show that the bounds on prevalence are much tighter for the non-
ICLI hospitalized population than for the population as a whole. This tighter bound is
informative for general population prevalence only under assumptions about hospital
representativeness, either a monotonicity assumption or an equal prevalence assump-
tion. How valid are these assumptions? Assessing them directly is of course impossible
because we lack data on prevalence in the population as a whole or in the hospital sample.
We have already provided one piece of indirect evidence in support of our hospital
representativeness assumptions. The non-ICLI and clear-cause samples generate similar
bounds, and, within the clear-cause sample, there are not large differences in bounds
across different causes of admission. This suggests that prevalence does not vary with the
exact set of hospitalizations studied, although of course this does not prove monotonicity
or representativeness.
In this section, we provide two additional pieces of evidence on the hospital IV as-
sumptions. First we show that the hospital bounds are consistent with the estimates of
population prevalence from the Indiana COVID-19 Random Sample Study (Menachemi
et al., 2020; Richard M. Fairbanks School of Public Health, 2020).11 Second, we compare
the hospital sample to the general population in terms of their likelihood of prior testing
(prior to the hospital data) and the test rate of their home counties. We take these to be
proxies for their concern about COVID, although other interpretations are possible.
5.1 Comparison to random sample testing
A valuable benchmark for the hospital-based prevalence bounds comes from a large-
scale study of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in Indiana. The study invited a representative
sample of Indiana residents (aged 12 and older) to obtain a SARS-CoV-2 test. The first
wave of the study took place April 25-29, and the second wave took place June 3-7. The
preliminary results are reported in Menachemi et al. (2020) and Richard M. Fairbanks
School of Public Health (2020). The response rate was roughly 25 percent, and no attempt
was made to correct for non-random response. Nonetheless this survey appears to be
the best benchmark available. We report the point estimates for prevalence (assuming
random nonresponse) and their confidence intervals in the top panel of Table 2. The first
11 Our data do not contain the test results from the Random Sample Study, so we compare our bounds to
the published results.
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wave estimates 1.7 percent prevalence and the second 0.5 percent.12
We compare our prevalence bound during the same time periods in the bottom panel
of the table. We limit our sample to tests of people aged 12 and older, for comparison
with the population study. Using population testing we obtain very wide bounds that
contain the random sample study estimates. This fact provides some support for the test
monotonicity assumption. For both the non-COVID hospitalization and clear-cause hos-
pitalization samples, the bounds are much tighter. Both sets of upper and lower bounds
contain the April prevalence estimate, and both sets exclude the June estimate point esti-
mates. However the confidence interval for the June 3-7 point estimates overlaps substan-
tially with the non-ICLI and clear-cause bounds. Thus for both dates the prevalence point
estimates are consistent with the bounds obtained from the non-COVID hospitalizations.
As a comparison we also report the bounds from the ICLI-related hospitalizations, which
always exclude the random sample estimates.
5.2 Comparison of prior testing and community testing
A standard way of measuring representativeness is to compare the distribution of
covariates in a study population to their distribution in the target population. In our
case, this approach is most convincing if we have well-measured covariates that proxy
for having COVID-19. Two candidate covariates are the community SARS-CoV-2 testing
rate and the prior testing rate. The idea behind these proxies is that people who come
from areas with high test rates, or who have been tested in the past, may themselves have
a higher current likelihood of having COVID-19.
To operationalize these measures, we define the community testing rate for person i as
the fraction of people in i’s county who have ever been tested, as of the end of our sample
period. We define the prior test rate of person i as of date t as the probability that i was
tested at least once during the week-long period [t− 15, t− 9]. We focus on this window
because it is the second week prior to our hospital testing window (which runs from
t − 2 to t + 4 for a patient admitted at t). We allow for a week of time to elapse between
the hospitalization and the “prior” testing because it is possible that some pre-hospital
testing would occur in the window [t − 8, t − 3]. When studying prior tests, we limit the
sample to each person’s first hospitalization after March 1, 2020, to avoid picking up the
higher testing that mechanically results from the fact that people hospitalized once are
more likely than the general population to have been previously hospitalized. As with
12 The estimates in Table 2 are slightly different from those reported by Richard M. Fairbanks School of
Public Health (2020). We report updated calculations, based on correspondence with the authors.
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our bounds, here we weight the data to match the population age distribution.
Table 3 shows the community testing rate. The average county has a testing rate of
3.5%, with an interquartile range of 2.5% to 4.3%. The average person lives in a county
with a test rate of 3.6%. The average non-ICLI hospitalized patient comes from a county
with a test rate of 4.1%: for clear-cause hospitalizations it is 4.0%, and for ICLI hospital-
izations it is 4.2%. These rates are all significantly different from the population average.
Figure 5 shows the prior testing rate as a function of admission date for the non-ICLI
hospitalization sample, the clear-cause hospitalization sample, and the general popula-
tion (for which the prior test rate on day t is defined as the fraction tested between t− 15
and t − 9). The rates in the hospitalization samples are initially close to the population
rate (when testing is low in general), but the lines diverge. By the last week of the sam-
ple, the prior testing rate is about 1.5 percentage points in the hospitalization samples,
relative to approximately .75 percentage points in the population. Although the weekly
differences are not individually statistically significant, overall the greater rate of prior
testing is consistent with positive selection into hospitalization. However it is also con-
sistent with the possibility that the hospitalization sample simply has more contact with
the medical sector, resulting in greater testing at a given SARS-CoV-2 prevalence.
6 Conclusion
We have calculated weekly bounds on the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 for the Indiana
population as a whole and for three hospitalized populations: people hospitalized for
influenza- and COVID-like illness, people hospitalized for other reasons, and people with
clear (and clearly not COVID) causes of hospitalization. The bounds are valid under weak
monotonicity assumptions. The bounds for the general population are wide but narrow
over time. The bounds for the hospitalized population are much tighter, because the
hospitalized populations are tested at a much higher rate than the general population.
The hospitalized populations are informative for the general population only under
additional, stronger assumptions. In particular, if the hospitalized population is represen-
tative of the general population in terms of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence, then both the upper
and lower bounds are valid. If the hospitalized population has a higher prevalence than
the general population, then only the upper bound is valid. We assess these assumptions
in multiple ways. We find that the non-COVID hospitalized population bounds contained
the point estimate of prevalence from a random sample in late April. By early June the
point estimate from the random sample was below our lower bound, although we can-
not reject that it was inside the bound. Hospitalized patients also appear to be tested
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for SARS-CoV-2 at somewhat higher rates than the general population, even outside the
hospital. This last fact suggests that the representativeness assumption may be violated
(although the magnitude may not be too severe), but both are consistent with a weaker
monotonicity condition. Even under this monotonicity condition, the hospital data are
still useful, bringing down the upper bound on population prevalence by a third or more.
We believe that the main promise of the non-COVID hospitalization population is that
it can provide near-real time information about population prevalence. Only three num-
bers are necessary to calculate bounds from the non-COVID hospitalizations: the count
of non-COVID admissions, the number of tests among this group, and the number of
positive results. Although these numbers are not currently reported, many states already
report related numbers, including both the number of COVID tests and the count of ICLI-
related hospitalizations. Thus the infrastructure largely exists already to calculate these
bounds. The results here help validate this approach for real-time surveillance.
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Figure 1: Weekly test rates by sample
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Notes: Figure plots the test rate in each seven-day period of our data, for four samples: the general popu-
lation, ICLI hospitalizations, non-ICLI hospitalizations, and clear cause hospitalizations. ICLI hospitaliza-
tions have at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or COVID-like illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are
hospitalizations for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fracture or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or
accidents (vehicle or other). See Appendix B for definitions. For the general population, the test rate is the
fraction of people tested at least once in that week. For the hospitalizations, the test rate is the fraction of
hospitalizations admitted in that week with a test between two days prior to admission and four days after.
27
Figure 2: Weekly bounds on prevalence under test monotonicity, by sample
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Notes: Figure plots the weekly bounds on prevalence under test monotonicity, for four samples: the general
population, ICLI hospitalizations, non-ICLI hospitalizations, and clear cause hospitalizations. The lower
bound is the confirmed positive rate and the upper bound is the positivity rate. ICLI hospitalizations have
at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or COVID-like illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are hospitaliza-
tions for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fracture or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or accidents
(vehicle or other). See Appendix B for definitions.
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Figure 3: Monthly test rates by cause of admission
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Notes: Figure plots the monthly test rates among people admitted to the hospital for the indicated condi-
tion. See Appendix B for definitions.
Figure 4: Monthly bounds on prevalence by cause of admission under test monotonicity
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Notes: Figure plots the lower and upper bounds on prevalence, by cause of cause of admission and month,
assuming test monotonicity. See Appendix B for definitions.
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Figure 5: Prior test rates, population and hospitalization samples
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Notes: The prior test rate is the fraction of the group at date t that was tested between t − 15 and t − 9.
Figure plots the average prior test rate for the population, for non-ICLI hospitalizations (in the left panel)
and for clear cause hospitalizations (right panel). The shaded area is the 95% confidence interval for each
week and hospitalization sample.
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Table 1: Person-level summary statistics
Hospitalized
Full Ever Has Not Clear
Sample State Tested Ever Diagnosis ICLI cause ICLI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age as of 1/1/2020
Born after 1/1 0.002 0.110 0.120 0.134 0.003 0.003
0-17 0.237 0.045 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.047
18-29 0.166 0.152 0.119 0.120 0.129 0.179 0.039
30-50 0.250 0.296 0.183 0.179 0.183 0.184 0.137
50-64 0.197 0.256 0.204 0.199 0.190 0.193 0.263
65-74 0.087 0.137 0.163 0.160 0.153 0.173 0.222
75+ 0.063 0.111 0.183 0.189 0.179 0.243 0.288
Age unknown 0.028 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Gender
Male 0.493 0.402 0.417 0.429 0.422 0.391 0.486
Female 0.507 0.569 0.582 0.570 0.577 0.609 0.514
Unknown 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Race/ethnicity
White 0.848 0.853 0.858 0.826 0.829 0.851 0.806
Black 0.099 0.125 0.121 0.149 0.146 0.123 0.175
Race unknown 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test variables
Ever tested 0.042 1.000 0.214 0.254 0.225 0.256 0.523
Confirmed positive 0.004 0.097 0.025 0.034 0.017 0.017 0.154
People 6,637,426 280,816 256,062 153,716 137,176 30,619 23,014
Counties 92 92 92 92 92 92 90
Notes: Column 1 reports characteristics for the set of people appearing in the test data, and columns 2-6
for people appearing the hospital data, ever (column 2), with at least one diagnosis (column 3), at least one
non-ICLI hospitalization for ICLI (column 4), at least one clear cause hospitalization (column 5, see text for
details), or at least one ICLI hospitalization with a diagnosis and not for ICLI (column 6).
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Table 2: Do our bounds contain estimates of prevalence from random-sample testing?
Time period April 25-29 June 3 -7
Random Sample Study
Prevalence estimates 0.017 0.005
95% confidence interval (0.011, 0.025) (0.002, 0.013)
Bounds from...
Population testing [0.000, 0.145] [0.000, 0.056]
Non-ICLI hospitalizations [0.015, 0.069] [0.009, 0.031]
Clear cause hospitalizations [0.009, 0.042] [0.006, 0.018]
ICLI-related hospitalizations [0.242, 0.415] [0.166, 0.261]
Notes: The first two rows of the table report the estimated population prevalence and 95% confidence
interval from the Indiana COVID-19 Random Sample Study, conducted over the indicated dates, which
assumes random nonresponse (Menachemi et al., 2020; Richard M. Fairbanks School of Public Health, 2020).
The remaining rows report the (age-adjusted) bounds on prevalence from our different samples: population
testing, non-ICLI hospitalizations, clear cause hospitalizations, and ICLI-related hospitalizations. We limit
our sample to people aged 12 and older, for consistency with the Random Sample Study.
Table 3: County testing rates
County test rate
County-level
Average county .035
25th percentile .025
75th percentile .043
Person level
Average person .036
Non-ICLI hospitalization .041
T-statistic 157.4
Clear cause hospitalization .04
T-statistic 66.4
ICLI hospitalization .042
T-statistic 78.8
Notes: The county test rate is the share of the county population tested at least once in our test data. Table
reports county-level statistics, as well as the average county test rates for the general population, the non-
ICLI hospitalizations, clear cause hospitalizations, and ICLI hospitalizations, as well as t-statistic for the
null hypothesis that the average person and the average hospitalization have the same county test rate.
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A Appendix figures and tables
Figure A.1: Positive cases in our data and on state dashboard
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State dashboard
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Notes: Figure plots 7-day moving average of the number of positive cases reported on Indiana’s COVID-19
dashboard (Indiana State Department of Health, 2020), as well as the number of positive cases observed in
our data.
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Table A.1: Weekly test rates, by sample
Sample Population Non-ICLI Clear Cause ICLI
% Tested N % Tested N % Tested N % Tested
Week (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
3/13/2020 0.000 5,937 0.035 1,342 0.019 1,102 0.244
3/20/2020 0.001 5,054 0.105 1,262 0.064 1,179 0.670
3/27/2020 0.002 4,585 0.157 1,178 0.129 1,292 0.728
4/03/2020 0.002 4,573 0.177 1,246 0.128 1,150 0.749
4/10/2020 0.002 4,702 0.167 1,225 0.111 1,041 0.659
4/17/2020 0.002 4,913 0.180 1,329 0.170 1,146 0.597
4/24/2020 0.003 5,126 0.180 1,377 0.149 1,052 0.515
5/01/2020 0.004 5,618 0.277 1,420 0.289 1,143 0.676
5/08/2020 0.005 6,031 0.284 1,531 0.235 1,050 0.692
5/15/2020 0.006 6,658 0.285 1,549 0.248 1,081 0.737
5/22/2020 0.004 6,663 0.267 1,565 0.238 1,026 0.663
5/29/2020 0.005 6,763 0.280 1,542 0.271 947 0.681
6/05/2020 0.006 7,172 0.263 1,684 0.269 943 0.690
6/12/2020 0.004 6,091 0.243 1,411 0.209 776 0.661
Notes: Table reports the weekly test rate for the population, and the number of hospitalizations and test
rate, by type of hospitalizations, weighted to match the population age distribution.. (The population size is
6.64 million in all weeks.) ICLI hospitalizations have at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or COVID-like
illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are hospitalizations for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fracture
or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or accidents (vehicle or other). See Appendix B for definitions.
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Table A.2: Weekly test rates, by sample, not age weighted
Sample Population Non-ICLI Clear Cause ICLI
% Tested N % Tested N % Tested N % Tested
Week (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
3/13/2020 0.000 5,937 0.035 1,342 0.019 1,102 0.244
3/20/2020 0.001 5,054 0.105 1,262 0.064 1,179 0.670
3/27/2020 0.002 4,585 0.157 1,178 0.129 1,292 0.728
4/03/2020 0.002 4,573 0.177 1,246 0.128 1,150 0.749
4/10/2020 0.002 4,702 0.167 1,225 0.111 1,041 0.659
4/17/2020 0.002 4,913 0.180 1,329 0.170 1,146 0.597
4/24/2020 0.003 5,126 0.180 1,377 0.149 1,052 0.515
5/01/2020 0.004 5,618 0.277 1,420 0.289 1,143 0.676
5/08/2020 0.005 6,031 0.284 1,531 0.235 1,050 0.692
5/15/2020 0.006 6,658 0.285 1,549 0.248 1,081 0.737
5/22/2020 0.004 6,663 0.267 1,565 0.238 1,026 0.663
5/29/2020 0.005 6,763 0.280 1,542 0.271 947 0.681
6/05/2020 0.006 7,172 0.263 1,684 0.269 943 0.690
6/12/2020 0.004 6,091 0.243 1,411 0.209 776 0.661
Notes: Table reports the weekly test rate for the population, and the number of hospitalizations and test
rate, by type of hospitalizations. (The population size is 6.64 million in all weeks.) ICLI hospitalizations
have at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or COVID-like illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are hos-
pitalizations for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fracture or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or
accidents (vehicle or other). See Appendix B for definitions.
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Table A.3: Weekly bounds on prevalence under monotonicity, by sample
Sample Population Non-ICLI Clear Cause ICLI
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Week (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
3/13/2020 0.0000 0.121 0.0022 0.055 0.0012 0.037 0.0468 0.171
3/20/2020 0.0002 0.154 0.0130 0.116 0.0104 0.106 0.2128 0.312
3/27/2020 0.0004 0.175 0.0264 0.147 0.0136 0.090 0.3050 0.402
4/03/2020 0.0004 0.157 0.0217 0.119 0.0120 0.071 0.2480 0.325
4/10/2020 0.0004 0.158 0.0193 0.112 0.0099 0.085 0.2127 0.312
4/17/2020 0.0005 0.187 0.0089 0.044 0.0047 0.027 0.1417 0.230
4/24/2020 0.0006 0.141 0.0129 0.068 0.0071 0.038 0.1873 0.348
5/01/2020 0.0006 0.125 0.0148 0.052 0.0120 0.042 0.2074 0.312
5/08/2020 0.0005 0.094 0.0111 0.037 0.0155 0.069 0.1414 0.210
5/15/2020 0.0005 0.088 0.0099 0.033 0.0100 0.039 0.1590 0.221
5/22/2020 0.0003 0.076 0.0141 0.053 0.0087 0.033 0.1411 0.202
5/29/2020 0.0003 0.063 0.0079 0.027 0.0059 0.020 0.1227 0.179
6/05/2020 0.0003 0.047 0.0085 0.032 0.0061 0.021 0.1348 0.195
6/12/2020 0.0001 0.041 0.0062 0.026 0.0037 0.017 0.0970 0.153
Notes: Table reports weekly bounds on COVID prevalence in the indicated sample under test monotonicity,
weighted to match the population age distribution. The lower bound is the confirmed positive rate and the
upper bound is the positivity rate. ICLI hospitalizations have at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or
COVID-like illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are hospitalizations for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI,
stroke, fracture or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or accidents (vehicle or other). See Appendix B for
definitions.
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Table A.4: Weekly bounds on prevalence under monotonicity, by sample, not age-
weighted
Sample Population Non-ICLI Clear Cause ICLI
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Week (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
3/13/2020 0.0000 0.150 0.0036 0.112 0.0022 0.079 0.0534 0.228
3/20/2020 0.0002 0.189 0.0153 0.158 0.0142 0.176 0.2713 0.416
3/27/2020 0.0004 0.217 0.0303 0.196 0.0195 0.128 0.3927 0.510
4/03/2020 0.0004 0.191 0.0252 0.141 0.0223 0.133 0.3131 0.410
4/10/2020 0.0004 0.189 0.0232 0.128 0.0155 0.093 0.2620 0.374
4/17/2020 0.0005 0.214 0.0124 0.068 0.0090 0.046 0.1922 0.315
4/24/2020 0.0006 0.167 0.0149 0.081 0.0109 0.062 0.1896 0.369
5/01/2020 0.0006 0.131 0.0157 0.057 0.0169 0.052 0.2047 0.308
5/08/2020 0.0005 0.097 0.0126 0.046 0.0137 0.047 0.1698 0.248
5/15/2020 0.0005 0.087 0.0122 0.043 0.0148 0.047 0.1616 0.224
5/22/2020 0.0003 0.074 0.0134 0.050 0.0159 0.055 0.1654 0.236
5/29/2020 0.0003 0.060 0.0088 0.032 0.0084 0.027 0.1309 0.188
6/05/2020 0.0003 0.045 0.0089 0.033 0.0089 0.029 0.1391 0.207
6/12/2020 0.0002 0.036 0.0058 0.024 0.0049 0.019 0.1121 0.183
Notes: Table reports weekly bounds on COVID prevalence in the indicated sample under test monotonicity.
The lower bound is the confirmed positive rate and the upper bound is the positivity rate. ICLI hospitaliza-
tions have at least one diagnosis for influenza-like or COVID-like illness. Clear cause hospitalizations are
hospitalizations for cancer, labor and delivery, AMI, stroke, fracture or crush, open wound, appendicitis, or
accidents (vehicle or other). See Appendix B for definitions.
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Table A.5: Demographics and test rates among hospitalized patients, by group
Number of Age
Group Admissions Newborn 0-17 18-29 30-49 50-64 65-74 >74
All 236,267 0.085 0.029 0.108 0.185 0.226 0.176 0.191
Has diagnosis 106,354 0.108 0.025 0.117 0.182 0.209 0.167 0.192
ICLI 14,992 0.004 0.024 0.039 0.153 0.274 0.231 0.276
Non-ICLI 91,362 0.125 0.026 0.130 0.187 0.198 0.157 0.178
Clear cause 19,721 0.003 0.032 0.173 0.183 0.194 0.178 0.237
Cancer 3,159 0.000 0.052 0.027 0.119 0.330 0.288 0.184
Labor/delivery 4,690 0.010 0.015 0.595 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000
AMI 2,567 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.110 0.324 0.273 0.288
Stroke 2,652 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.088 0.286 0.263 0.346
Fracture 4,147 0.002 0.038 0.061 0.122 0.175 0.193 0.409
Open wound 1,125 0.000 0.050 0.101 0.186 0.208 0.172 0.283
Appendicitis 633 0.000 0.212 0.196 0.275 0.185 0.085 0.047
Vehicle accident 582 0.002 0.089 0.194 0.304 0.215 0.134 0.062
Other accident 3,072 0.002 0.035 0.034 0.079 0.154 0.213 0.483
Notes: Table reports the number and age distribution of admissions, for different categories of admissions,
over the time period March 13, 2020 through June 18, 2020. See Appendix B for definitions of the different
causes of admissions (Cancer-other accident).
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Table A.6: Test rates and prevalence bounds under monotonicity, by month and cause of
admission
Month # Admits % Tested Lower bound Upper bound
A. Cancer
March 595 0.069 0.002 0.024
April 873 0.166 0.008 0.048
May 1,029 0.269 0.005 0.018
June 662 0.183 0.000 0.000
B. Labor and delivery
March 904 0.009 0.000 0.000
April 1,456 0.052 0.003 0.053
May 1,489 0.163 0.007 0.041
June 841 0.188 0.004 0.019
C. AMI
March 437 0.188 0.023 0.122
April 706 0.344 0.041 0.119
May 839 0.451 0.041 0.090
June 585 0.373 0.012 0.032
D. Stroke
March 469 0.102 0.021 0.208
April 744 0.198 0.013 0.068
May 932 0.303 0.015 0.050
June 507 0.249 0.010 0.040
D. Fractures and crushes
March 616 0.055 0.002 0.029
April 1,109 0.210 0.011 0.052
May 1,483 0.373 0.014 0.038
June 939 0.408 0.011 0.026
Notes: Table reports monthly number of admissions for cancer, along with the percent of admissions tested
in hospital, and the bound on prevalence under test monotonicity. The lower bound is the confirmed
positive rate and the upper bound is the positivity rate. See Appendix B for definitions.
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Table A.7: Test rates and prevalence bounds under monotonicity, by month and cause of
admission (continued)
Month # Admits % Tested Lower bound Upper bound
E. Open wounds
March 182 0.110 0.005 0.050
April 294 0.167 0.010 0.061
May 401 0.314 0.025 0.079
June 248 0.298 0.016 0.054
F. Vehicle accidents
March 61 0.049 0.000 0.000
April 136 0.154 0.000 0.000
May 222 0.212 0.009 0.043
June 163 0.288 0.000 0.000
G. Other accidents
March 530 0.094 0.025 0.260
April 815 0.221 0.028 0.128
May 1,085 0.368 0.011 0.030
June 642 0.336 0.011 0.032
H. Appendicitis
March 120 0.033 0.017 0.500
April 153 0.203 0.000 0.000
May 228 0.333 0.022 0.066
June 132 0.417 0.008 0.018
Notes: Table reports monthly number of admissions for cancer, along with the percent of admissions tested
in hospital, and the bound on prevalence under test monotonicity. The lower bound is the confirmed
positive rate and the upper bound is the positivity rate. See Appendix B for definitions.
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B Defining causes of admissions
This section provides more details on our definition of ICLI, non-ICIL, and “clear
cause” hospitalization, listing the ICD-10 codes used to define each.
Following Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (2015), the codes for influenza-
like illness are B97.89, H66.9, H66.90, H66.91 H66.92, H66.93, J00, J01.9, J01.90, J06.9, J09,
J09.X, J09.X1, J09.2, J09.X3, J09.X9, J10, J10.0, J10.00, J10.01, J10.08, J10.1, J10.2, J10.8, J10.81,
J10.82, J10.83, J10.89, J11, J11.0, J11.00, J11.08, J11.1, J11.2, J11.8, J11.81, J11.82, J11.83, J11.89,
J12.89, J12.9, J18, J18.1, J18.8, J18.9, J20.9, J40, R05, and R50.9. We say a hospitalizaiton is
for an influenza-like illness if it has any of these diagnosis codes in any position. We say
a hospitalization is for a COVID-like illness if it has any ICD-10 code among those that is
among the CDC’s lists of diagnosis codes for COVID-19 Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (2020). These codes are J12.89, J20.8, J22, J40, J80, J98.8, O95.5, R05, R06.02,
R50.9, U07.1, Z03.818, Z11.58, and Z20.828.
We define ICLI-related hospitalizations as ones with at least one ILI or CLI diagnosis
code. We define non-ICLI related hospitalizations as hospitalized with diagnosis codes,
but no ILI or CLI code.
We also define “clear cause” hospitalizations. These are hospitalizations for labor and
delivery, AMI, stroke, fractures and crushes, wounds, vehicle accidents, other accidents,
appendicitis, or cancer. With the exception of cancer, we define a hospitalization as be-
longing to one of these groups if it has any diagnosis codes for that group, listed below.
Cancer is treated differently because it can be a comorbidity. We say a hospitalization is
for cancer if a cancer diagnosis (listed below) is an admitting diagnosis, the primary final
diagnosis, or if chemotherapy diagnosis is present. We use the following ICD-10 codes.
• AMI I21, I22.
• Appendicitis K35-K38.
• Cancer C00-C97 (in primary or admitting diagnosis), or Z51.0-Z51.2 (in any posi-
tion).
• Fracture/Crush S02, S12, S22, S32, S42, S52, S62, S72, S82, S92, T02, S07, S17, S37,
S47, S57,S67, S77, S87, S97, T07.
• Labor and delivery O60-O75, O80-O84.
• Other accidents W00-W99, X00-X59.
• Stroke I61-I64.
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• Vehicle accident V01-V99.
• Wound S01, S11, S21, S31, S41, S51, S61, S71, S81, S91, T01.
42
C Calculating negative predictive values with test-retest
data
Setup and identification Here we show how to use data on multiple tests to simul-
taneously identify prevalence, test error rates, and how to use this information to obtain
the negative predictive value, NPV. Assume in particular that people have been tested ex-
actly twice, with R1i the outcome of the first test and R2i the outcome of the second test
for person i, and Ci person i’s true infection status, which we assume is fixed between the
tests. Let p = Pr(Ci = 1) be the prevalence of active SARS-CoV-2 infections in this twice
tested population.
Test outcomes may differ from true infection status because of test errors. In general,
therefore, there are four possible sequences of test outcomes: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). We
let Pab = Pr(R1i = a,R2i = b) for (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2.
We make three strong assumptions to simplify the analysis.
1. The specificity of the test is 1. That is, β = Pr(Rji = 0|Ci = 0) = 1.
2. The sensitivity of the test, α = Pr(Rji = 1|Ci = 1), does not depend on the initial
test result.
3. Retesting is random, i.e. independent of R1i and Ci.
Assumption 1 is the weakest of these assumptions. It implies that there are no false posi-
tives, which is consistent with typical practice (UCSF Health Hospital Epidemiology and
Infection Prevention, 2020). The remaining assumptions are stronger. Assumption 2 says
that the test errors are independent of the initial test result. It would be violated, for ex-
ample, if false negatives are more common for patients with high levels of mucus, and
mucus levels are correlated across test results. Assumption 3 says that retesting rates do
not depend on possible testing errors. We would expect this condition to fail if highly
symptomatic people with negative tests are especially likely to test negative. We view
this assumption as the most suspect.
Under these assumptions, the probabilities Pab simplify considerable. As the proba-
bilities sum to one, and the assumptions imply that P10 = P01, the only non-redundant
probabilities are
P00 = (1− p) + p(1− α)2
P11 = pα
2.
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We can observe P00 and P11. Solving for the unknowns p and α, we have
p =
(P00 − P11 − 1)2
4P11
α =
2P11
1− P00 + P11
This shows how to get p and α from two tests and the assumption that specificity equals 1.
Our goal is to find the negative predictive value, but we can calculate it given knowledge
of α, β and p. In general the NPV of a single test is Pr(Ci = 0|Ri = 0). Applying Bayes
rule,
NPV =
1− p
p(1− α) + (1− p)
Results To implement this approach, we construct a sample of all people who are
tested on a given day, not tested the previous day, and then tested again in the next day.
There are 16,401 such test pairs. We find P00 = 0.88 and P11 = 0.11. Nearly all the mass is
on the diagonals; test results switch less than 1% of the time. This fact, together with the
assumption that specificity is equal to 1, implies very low false negative rates. Plugging
these values into our formula, we have p = 0.12 and α = 0.96, which imply NPV = 0.995.
Using instead, all people who are retested once within a three day period, we find similar
results: p = 0.13, α = 0.91, NPV = 0.986.
We emphasize that these estimates are valid for the twice-tested population and under
assumptions 1-3, in particular, random retesting. The prevalence estimate is the preva-
lence among people tested twice, not the population prevalence. And it is only a valid
estimate under assumptions 1-3. In reality, it is likely that retests are most common among
suspected false negatives (i.e. when a highly symptomatic patient tests negative). We see
some evidence for this: P01 = 0.006 and P10 = 0.003, inconsistent with the random retest-
ing assumption. We therefore do not view our estimates of prevalence and sensitivity
as definitive; rather we think of the sensitivity estimate as a lower bound on sensitivity,
because we have selected a retest sample which has a disproportionate number of false
negatives. As NPV is increasing in sensitivity, α, our implied estimate of 1 − NPV is
likely an upper bound on 1−NPV .
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